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CHARLES N. BROWER*

The Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States and the American
Constitutional Tradition: A Bicentennial
Perspective on the "New
International Economic Order"
A brief Bicentennial query consisting of one (hypothetical) multiple choice
question quickly brings our subject into focus. The question is: Who made this
indignant statement, and when?.
This insolent tract, this abomination of juvenile presumptuousness, reflects such
appallingly naive assumptions regarding the world at large as to be incapable of further
debasement, even by the impertinent draftsmanship of its ungrateful authors.
The possible answers from which you are to select the most appropriate one
are:
-(a) An anonymous middle-aged junior high school principal of the late 1960s
when presented by the seventh grade with a pupils' bill of rights.
(b) King George III of England upon reading the Declaration of Independence signed 200 years ago.
(c) Former Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan reporting to the President
on the United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.
(d) All of the above.
Clearly, no matter which substantive position one takes with respect to the
charter,' it is neither a juvenile outburst nor a classic expression rivaling the
great documents of our own history. It is neither a tantrum nor the tablets of
Moses. In any event, like King George and our anonymous junior high school
principal, we have now seen the tumultuous moment pass and have already
grown somewhat accustomed to the necessity of dealing with that which has
transpired. The charter and its precise relationship to the American constitutional tradition become evident upon a review of the themes recurrent in its
provisions. I
*Member of the District of Columbia and New York Bars; formerly Acting Legal Adviser, United
States Department of State.
tThis article is adapted from an address by the author to the Philadelphia Conference On The
Economic Interdependence of Nations, March 26, 1976.
'G.A.Res. 3281, UN Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (1975) reproduced in 14 INT'L LEo. MAT'LS 251

(1975); text as adopted also contained in REPORT OF THE SECOND
(1974) reproduced in relevant part in 9 INT'L LAWYER 385 (1975).
2

COMMITTEE,

UN Doc. A/9946

For a detailed section-by-section analysis see Brower &Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights
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First of all, the charter is as much prologue as it is proclamation. It is not just
a statement of finally determined substantive rights and duties of states in the
economic field. It also is intended to load the negotiating dice in favor of the
less-developed world in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations on all subjects. In bilateral negotiations on economic matters with a large industralized
country, and even in broader multilateral negotiations, less developed countries
over the years have found themselves naturally limited by the material
circumstances of their own individual bargaining positions. They have come to
feel, with a certain degree of justification, that their economic weakness and
lack of sophistication necessarily have been reflected in the bargains they have
struck. In seeking to rectify this imbalance these countries have realized the
simple truth that in a world where politics rests on the principle of "one man one
vote" their strength is in numbers, and clearly both that principle and their
numbers are strongest at the United Nations.
For these reasons the charter embraces substantive provisions quite
analogous to our own domestic development in the area broadly described as
civil rights. To adopt the domestic vernacular, the charter plumps for equal
opportunity, which rapidly is transformed into affirmative action. The charter
includes several important provisions to the effect that every state is free to
choose its own economic and political, as well as social and cultural system,
"without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever."
(Article 1.) Specifically, the charter propounds the right of every state "to
participate fully and effectively in the international decision-making process in
the solution of world economic, financial and monetary problems ..
(Article 10.) The charter (Article 32) provides expressly that:
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the
exercise of its sovereign rights.
Beyond this, however, the charter, akin to our own domestic law, at least in
its practical application, mandates a distinct bias towards assisting developing
countries to be in a better position to take advantage of their equal opportunities. Numerous articles of the charter promoting economic progress and accelerated development, both generally and specifically, express such a bias with
language such as "especially developing countries," "especially that of the
developing countries," "particularly of developing countries," "for the benefit
of the developing countries." (Articles 8, 9, 11 and 13.) Just as our domestic
equal opportunity legislation is designed to afford identifiable groups of
historically less prosperous citizens an improved position from which to bargain
and Duties of States: A Reflection orRejection of InternationalLaw?, 9 INT'L LAWYER 295 (1975);
see also Haight, The New InternationalEconomic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and

Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAWYER 591 (1975).
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in their own daily life and employment, so the charter is intended in large part
to change the rules of the game so that the less favored may have a far better
chance.
It should be noted that of the 33 articles of the charter fully 20 fall into this
broad category of equal opportunity and affirmative action. Only four of these
(Articles 4, 19, 20 and 26) were opposed in the final round of negotiations by
any of the industrialized states, 3 notwithstanding that some of them were
addressed to very precise subjects such as trade, foreign exchange, trade in
invisibles, tariffs, and generalized preferences. (Articles 14, 18, 19, 21 and 27.)
Thus insofar as the bulk of the charter has been concerned, the industrialized
nations in the last analysis have had little substantive objection. In their broad
emphasis, both general and specific, on equality of opportunity among nations
and on a substantive disposition to assist and bolster the less developed portions
of the world, those less developed countries have adhered to the highest moral
traditions in confirming as matters of international right and duty those
precepts which in the United States have long characterized the governance of a
free people.
Where the charter and its sponsors have encountered pronounced opposition
is in those substantive areas where they have sought to depart from fundamental
provisions of law long embodied in the political and jurisprudential history of
the United States and to a large extent in that of the broader industrialized
world. Here we are speaking predominantly of two areas, that of international
commodity cartels and compensation for expropriation of foreign investment.
Let us turn first to the more novel problem, that of international
cartelization. Since the birth of the Sherman Act conspiracies and combinations
in restraint of trade have been very severely frowned upon in this country.
Perhaps not everyone has forgotten the essential wickedness we attributed to
cartelization in the days of Nazi Germany and the prominent emphasis we
placed in the post-war administration of Germany on breaking up the cartels
and preventing them from ever again rearing their most unlovely countenance.I
More recently the European Economic Community itself has adopted important
rules in this area which have been enforced with a perhaps unexpected vigor.' It
is among our most elementary rules of law and economics that competition is
normally beneficial and that the unreasonable restraint thereof is evil,
particularly where the effect is to monopolize.

3

Article 4:

REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE,

UN Doc. A/9946 (1974) at 25; Article 19: Id.

at 18; Article 20: Id. at 25; Article 26: Id.
'Protocol of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, Art. II, § B, 1 12, 3 C.

BEVANS,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-

1949 at 1207 (Dep't of State Pub. 8484 (1969)).
5
reaty Establishing the European Economic Community, January 1, 1958, Articles 85 and 86,
298 U.N.T.S. 47, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2422 (1972).
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Yet among the salient provisions of the charter, embracing its most
advertised elements, are articles endorsing the right to form such cartels. Article
5 of the charter reads in pertinent part:
All States have the right to associate in organizations of primary commodity producers
in order to develop their national economies to achieve stable financing for their
development, and in pursuance of their aims assisting in the promotion of sustained
growth of the world economy, in particular accelerating the development of developing
countries.
Article 5 continues by imposing a duty on non-cartel states to "respect that right
by refraining from applying economic and political measures that would limit
it," presumably even if the cartel is guilty of coercion as a matter of law, and
regardless of whether such defensive "measures" themselves constitute
coercion. Eleven nations in the United Nations deliberations moved to delete
Article 5 from the charter, but were defeated by 98 votes to 15 with 8
abstentions.'
The express right to form cartels was further bolstered by Article 6, which
promotes the conclusion of long-term multilateral commodity agreements,
"taking into account the interests of producers and consumers." A modified
proposal was offered by substantially the same group of industrialized
countries, one which would provide for "the regular flow of raw material
supplies" and would place limitations on long-term multilateral commodity
agreements. 7 This amendment, too, was defeated by a substantial vote, 95 for,
17 against, and 10 abstentions. 8
The industralized nations of the West, virtually all of which are very significantly dependent for their production upon raw materials from less developed
parts of the world, have reacted with predictable and justified displeasure at
what they regard as economic blackmail on the part of the less developed world.
They are inclined to feel that the less developed countries have stepped over the
line dividing equal opportunity and affirmative action, on the one hand, from
extortion on the other hand. The actual practice of some oil producing countries
commencing in late 1973 and early 1974 has resulted in major disruption and
dislocation within the Western economy, and has provided a very disturbing
example of what can happen in the future. The industrialized world, which at
least in North America and Western Europe now includes among its major
operating premises the principle of substantial unrestrained competition, will
not easily tolerate on the part of foreign sovereigns, be they developed or underdeveloped, behavior for which senior American business executives have been
jailed. 9
supra note 3 at 17 and 22.
'Id. at 17.
'Id. at 23.
'Agroup of twenty cases, known popularly as the "electrical equipment" or "Philadelphia" pricefixing cases because they were tried before the United States District Court in Philadelphia, is
'REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE,
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An even more important area of substantive contention between charter advocates and much of the industrialized world is the apparent insistence on the part
of the former that they deprive foreign investors of established property rights
without appropriate compensation, a principle repugnant to the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution and civilized standards of international
law and behavior which have been accepted for decades.' 0 The United States, in
conformity with generally accepted international law, has supported the
proposition that a country may not expropriate an alien unless the expropriation
(a) is for a public purpose, I"(b) is not discriminatory, 12 and (c) is compensated
promptly, adequately and effectively.' 3 Indeed, these principles were confirmed
by the United Nations General Assembly itself as recently as 1962 when it
adopted General Assembly Resolution 1803(XVII), known as the Declaration
on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: I4
In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with
rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in
accordance with international law.
The negotiating record made it clear that this resolution intended to apply the
generally accepted international standard of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. I
Increasingly, however, the economically less advantaged areas of the world,
and indeed some of the more developed areas of the globe, have come to feel
that it is fair to ask foreign capital to invest at its peril. Thus Article 2 of the
charter now provides only that "appropriate compensation should be paid by
the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and
regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent." This
provision is precatory, subjective and ungoverned by any international standard
whatsoever. In addition, there is no indication that expropriation should be for
a public purpose, or that it should be nondiscriminatory. It is wholly out of line
with our own historic traditions, and unacceptable as a matter of practical

noteworthy in that, in addition to substantial monetary fines on both companies and individuals, a
number of prison sentences were imposed on both guilty and nolo contendere pleas. The overall
result was seven 30-day sentences, which the officials were required to serve, and twenty-four
suspended sentences. 2 CCH TR,ADE REG. REP. 8801 (1974).
'°UNITED STATES CONST.

amend. V.

"ALl, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 185.
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 868 (2d Cir. 1961), affg., 193 F. Supp.
375 (S.D.N.Y.); this reasoning was adopted in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 183
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 US 1037 (1968). It is a particular application of the broader
principles of international law precluding discriminatory treatment of aliens not based on a rational
distinction (see Brower & Tepe, supra note 2 at n.58).
"RESTATEMENT, supra note 11 at §§ 185 and 187.
4
G.A. Res. 1803, 17 GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, UN Doc. A/5217 (1962).
"U. S.U.N. Press Release No. 4091 at 6, cited in Schwebel, The Story of the U.N. 's Declarationon
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463, 465 (1963).
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economics, that one should be expected to invest capital in a foreign country
without any assurance against being the next day entirely and arbitrarily
stripped of one's property."' Nor is it consistent with the jurisprudence of
international tribunals which have dealt with the confiscation issue.
To drive the point home, Article 2 further provides that:
[iun any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be
settled under the domestic law of a nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is
freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the
principles of free choice of means.
That is somewhat akin to having a marital dispute adjudicated by one of the
mothers-in-law. The thought that the legal standard to be applied in a particular case is going to be determined by one of the parties to the dispute is contrary
to civilized notions of fairness. Nemo unquam judicet in se.
The biggest and longest battle during the charter debates was over Article 2.
A rather moderate compromise was proposed by a group of 14 industrialized
countries including the United States. 17 It would have provided that expropriation be for a public purpose and that it be nondiscriminatory, at least among
aliens. It would have provided that investment agreements "be observed in good
faith" and would have required states to "fulfill in good faith their international
obligations." As to compensation, it would have provided simply that there
must be "just compensation in the light of all relevant circumstances," a
perhaps weak formulation. Notwithstanding that this compromise itself
represented a step backward from the resolution passed by the General
Assembly in 1962, and would have relied heavily on legislative history for the
proposition that it in fact embraced acceptable standards of international law, it
was soundly defeated on votes which brought no more than 20 favorable ballots
among well over 100.18 Even an attempt to postpone consideration of the charter
in the hope that further efforts would achieve a compromise was defeated by 81
votes to 20 with 15 abstentions.19
While the "juvenile presumptuousness" cited at the commencement of this
discussion, which took form as equal opportunity and affirmative action, was in
the end acceptable, the "appallingly naive assumptions regarding the world at

6
Additional evidence of the charter's excessively harsh and unrealistic approach is contained in
Article 16 which requires restitution for the economic and social consequences of "colonialism,
apartheid, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism and all forms of aggression, occupation and
dominion." This provision would patently expand international law, especially in paragraph 2,
which provides that "No State has the right to promote or encourage investments that may
constitute an obstacle to the liberation of a territory occupied by force."
7
REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE, supra note 3 at 16.
"Ild. at 22.
19
Id. at 20 and 21.
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large" to which reference was also made, and which are reflected in the provisions on cartels and compensation for expropriation, have proven unacceptable
to the industrialized world. The most disturbing aspect of the charter, however,
is not its evident shortsightedness in the substantive areas we have discussed,
but its conceptual rejection of the rule of law. This is its most pervasive and
fundamental fault, and the one which reflects the greatest flaw in the perception
of the world by the less developed countries.
The charter's attempted departure from existing provisions of international
law has been illustrated in our discussion of compensation for expropriation.
That discussion has also demonstrated that apart from their disagreement over
the existing international standards, the less developed countries reject the
adoption of any international standard and any adjudication by an impartial
international tribunal.
This rejection of what the more advanced areas of the world have treasured
since time immemorial is virtually endemic in the charter. Even an initial
reference to "international obligations" 20 is unfortunately restricted in that this
term may well not encompass customary international law. Several articles of
the charter (Articles 4, 12 and 22) contain parenthetical phrases arguably
importing the standards of international law, but the presence of such references in only those articles gives rise to the possible construction that the remaining 30-odd articles of the charter are not so governed. Amendments by
industrialized nations seeking to rectify this situation and to subject all rights
and duties described in the charter expressly to the rule of international law
were rejected.2 1 Largely for these reasons the American Bar Association adopted
Resolution 301 in 1974 urging the United States not to support the charter
unless it provide "that in the exercise of their economic rights and the
fulfillment of their economic duties states must act in accordance with international law." 22 Largely for these reasons the United States, joined by only five
other countries, voted against final adoption of the charter by the General
Assembly in December of 1974.23
The rejection by the less developed countries of the principle of international
law and impartial international adjudication is something like the American
Civil Liberties Union rejecting the United States Constitution. The neutrality of
the law and the equal administration of justice have ever been the protection of

'°Chapter I, paragraph (j).
"Brower & Tepe, supra note 2 at 303-304.

"Text reproduced at 9 INT'L

LAWYER

405 (1975).

"The General Assembly adopted the charter on December 12, 1974 by a vote of 120-6-10.
Negative votes were cast by Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg,
the United Kingdom and the United States. Abstaining were Austria, Canada, France, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1974, at 11, col.
I and 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 265 (1975).
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the weak, the poor and the oppressed. The strong man can defend himself with
his strength. The weak man has no strength and must somewhere find it.
Rather than seek it in the protection of others to whom he may thereby become
subservient, he may under our traditions seek it in the law.
It is true that the less developed nations feel that international law has been
developed predominantly by industrialized nations and consequently has been
weighted against the less developed world. One can sympathize with this, but to
throw the baby out with the bath seems an extraordinarily radical and
ultimately defeating remedy. Just as the pen has been mightier than the sword,
so are laws superior to legions.
Well, having said all of this, how do things stand today? What has happened
since adoption of the charter and to what may we look forward in the future?
There are modestly hopeful signs. The tone of international dialogue on the
subjects embraced by the charter certainly reached a fever pitch during the final
debates on that charter prior to its adoption in December of 1974. It appeared
that the fire storm of often bitter debate would be continued at some length,
particularly since Article 34 of the charter required that it be inscribed as an
agenda item for the very next session of the General Assembly. In the event,
however, this was not the case.
At the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, held in September of
1975, prior to the regular General Assembly session, the United States was very
successful in negotiating a more respectable resolution.2 4 While there were preambular references to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, as
well as other related declarations, the substantive provisions of the resolution
were very short on rhetoric and very long on the nuts-and-bolts kinds of items of
negotiation in world economic affairs for the future. It denoted a distinct
lowering of the atmospheric pressure and a redirection of less developed country
efforts towards substituting concrete solutions for diplomatic bombast.
Although, as required by the charter itself, there was discussion of the
charter at the regular General Assembly meeting, the session was relatively
quiet on the subject and contented itself with adopting a rather short, generally
confirmatory resolution, mostly limited to requiring the Economic and Social
Council to review implementation of the charter and prepare for further
General Assembly discussion two years hence. 2 S The charter certainly will not go
away, and its adverse aspects will always be with us, but one may hope that the
tide of rhetorical unrealism may abate, at least ever so slightly, and permit
2

G.A. Res. 3362, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3362 (S-VII) (1975); for text of the resolution, adopted by
the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly on September 16, 1976 see 73 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 558 (1975) or 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1524 (1975).
"G.A. Res. 3486, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3486 (XXX) (1976); for text of the resolution adopted by
the thirtieth session of the U.N. General Assembly on December 12, 1975 see 15 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS
175 (1976).
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practical labors once more to resume. It is perhaps appropriate to suggest that
international harmony on these subjects will be achieved, and substantive
progress made, in the degree that the developing world, which historically has
embraced the principles of Jefferson and Lincoln, respects the precepts of our
own constitutional tradition.
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